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Abstract: In this paper I outline the logical relations between political equality and the practice 
of imprisonment by the state. I identify the very limited conditions in which the citizen-rulers 
of a democratic state give it the authority to imprison them, and the still more limited 
conditions in which a democratic state has good reason to imprison its citizen-rulers. I further 
argue that this reason to imprison becomes less significant the more that formal political 
equality leads to substantive equality of political influence among citizens. The more 
democratic is the state, the more it will substitute restorative justice methods for 
imprisonment. I demonstrate that this democratic theory of punishment can explain recent 
huge rises in imprisonment rates in the US and the UK as one consequence of the retreat of 
political equality in those countries over the same period. I conclude by considering in turn the 
position of non-citizens in a penal regime of political equality; the persistent social injustice of 
democratic state punishment; and the inherent abolitionism of a penal theory based on a 
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There are many normative theories of state punishment. However, theories of 
state punishment that seek to derive a justification of the practice from specifically 
democratic premises are very rare.1 The need for a democratic theory of 
punishment is pressing because electoral politics has, in recent times, involved a 
race to the bottom in criminal justice policy resulting in more punitive penal 
rhetoric, more criminal laws, and more severe penalties for breaking them. It 
appears that democratic politics has resulted in true mass incarceration in the 
USA, and to unprecedentedly high levels of imprisonment in the UK.2  
The association between rising penal severity, populism and democracy is 
misleading. The phenomena of penal populism have occurred at a time of falling 
political participation both in elections and more generally.3 It is, therefore, an 
oversimplification to understand contemporary criminal justice policy as being 
politically popular with the electorate. It is better understood as one among many 
symptoms of the unpopularity of politics and a decline in participation in public 
life.4 Since penal populism is one aspect of the decline of ordinary citizens’ 
participation in the life of the state, its baleful effects are unlikely to be improved 
by further excluding citizens from political decision-making.5 On the contrary, as 
others have persuasively argued, there is every reason to think that penal severity 
will be moderated in practice by encouraging greater citizen participation both in 
the criminal process,6 and in the broader political deliberation about crime and 
punishment.7 
The potential of greater popular participation in criminal justice to lessen 
penal severity in practice is a very important subject, but it is not my direct 
concern here. Nor am I concerned with the influence of institutional structures of 
democratic decision-making on imprisonment.8 I want instead to explore the 
                                                     
1 See N Lacey, The Prisoner’s Dilemma (CUP, 2008) 6-7. What I mean by this claim is that those penal 
theorists who are sympathetic to democracy have generally relied on existing liberal moral philosophies of 
punishment. Good examples are the consequentialist Nicola Lacey, and the retributivist RA Duff whose 
expressive theory of punishment has, as Roberto Gargarella puts it, both a liberal and democratic ‘soul’ 
(R Gargarella, ‘The Place of the People in the Criminal Law’, paper given to Democracy and the Modes 
of Punishment Workshop, Edinburgh University, March 2015). One recent attempt to provide a purely 
democratic theory is C Brettschneider, Democratic Rights: The Substance of Self-Government (Princeton UP, 
2007) Ch 5. 
2 After huge increases in previous decades there has been a slight fall off in numbers in the last few years. 
For summaries see, The Sentencing Project, ‘Trends in US Corrections’ (2012) available at 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Trends_in_Corrections_Fact_sheet.pdf; Ministry of 
Justice, The Story of the Prison Population: 1993-2012, England and Wales (MoJ, 2013).  
3 For a summary of the UK experience, see C Hay, Why We Hate Politics (Polity, 2007) 11-39. 
4 I Loader, ‘The Anti-Politics of Crime’ (2008) 12(3) Theoretical Criminology 405; A Dzur, Punishment, 
Participatory Democracy and the Jury (OUP, 2012) 33.  
5 Dzur, ibid, 32. 
6 See Dzur, n 4 above; and V Barker, The Politics of Imprisonment (OUP, 2009), esp 181-82. 
7 I Loader, ‘For Penal Moderation: Notes Towards a Public Philosophy of Punishment’ (2010) 14(3) 
Theoretical Criminology 349, 363. 
8 See Lacey n 1 above; Barker n 6 above. 
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relation of democratic government and imprisonment in principle. I offer a sketch 
of a theory of justifiable punishment that adopts some of the insights of liberal 
penal theory, but democratizes them by putting political equality at the heart of its 
penal rationale. It is only a sketch. It will need much more work to secure its 
claims. However, I think it is worth sketching this democratic theory because its 
implication is that the more seriously a society takes the idea of political equality as 
its guiding principle, the more limited will be its use of imprisonment, and the 
more it will move to eliminate imprisonment entirely. By the same token, the 
weakening of political equality, such as we have experienced in recent times, will 
tend to increase penal severity. The strengthening of political equality is, therefore, 
the key to reducing imprisonment.  
In Section 1, I indicate the core proposition of what I take to be the 
dominant school of liberal penal theory, and I identify the key problem it has in 
setting limits to the severity and extent of punishment. In Section 2, I argue that all 
imprisonment constitutes an interference with political equality, an interference 
that amounts to a suspension of the political citizenship of the prisoner. In Section 
3, I outline the very limited conditions in which such a suspension of political 
citizenship is nevertheless consistent with political equality. I provisionally call this 
theory of punishment 'democratic retributivism'. In Section 4, I argue that 
democratic retributivism contains an inherent tendency to reduce and even to 
eliminate the need for imprisonment that is lacking in liberal theory. The argument 
up to this point will be abstract and will seem merely idealistic. In Section 5, 
therefore, I seek to show that, appearances notwithstanding, democratic 
retributivism offers a realistic explanation of our recent experience of rapidly rising 
incarceration. The democratic theory only appears unrealistic in so far as we take 
for granted the recent de-democratisation of our societies. In Section 6, I outline 
the implications of the argument for the punishment of non-citizens. In Section 7, 
I respond to a key normative criticism of retributive theory in general, specifically 
the proposition that retributivism is unjust because it judges concrete particular 
individuals by the standards of abstract universal citizens. I will argue that 
democratic retributivism, precisely because it is a theory of criminal justice, cannot 
escape this criticism entirely, but that the theory does radically mitigate its force. In 
the final section, I suggest that ‘democratic retributive abolitionism’ is a more 
precise name for this theory, and outline the significant obstacles to realising 





1 LIBERALISM AND PENAL MINIMALISM 
 
Liberal penal theories set out from the fundamental proposition that individuals 
enjoy an equal dignity as moral agents which constitutes them as ends in 
themselves, as persons who cannot rightly be used or coerced as a mere means to 
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collective social ends. Since the 1960s, liberal penal theory has moved sharply away 
from utilitarian justifications of punishment. Utilitarian justifications claimed to be 
committed to the principle of parsimony – that there should be no more 
punishment than necessary to maximize social welfare. However, utilitarian 
justifications encompassed the possibility that the status of individual persons as 
ends in themselves could be overridden for the greater good of society as a whole. 
The liberal commitment to respect the individual’s dignity has led moral 
philosophers to seek to ensure that the distribution of punishment is not unfair to 
the individual.9 The dominant trend in recent liberal penal theory has, therefore, 
been to limit punishment to only that which is proportionate to the seriousness of 
the offence,10 or at least to punishment that is not disproportionate.11 In this way, 
it is thought, the state respects the rights of the offender as a person enjoying the 
status of an end in themselves by giving them no more nor less than what they, as 
a result of their own conduct, deserve.12 By doing this, the law addresses the 
offender as a rational moral agent capable of conforming his conduct to the law. 
Most retributive theorists see the idea of proportional punishment as a constraint 
on the pursuit of the consequential justifications of punishment such as 
deterrence, rehabilitation or incapacitation.13 The precise shape of the combined 
theories varies but the idea that punishment should be proportional to what the 
offender deserves remains at the core of the attempt by liberal theorists to respect 
the dignity and rights of the individual person in the practice of state coercion.  
The key problem with the idea of proportional punishment is that, even if it 
is respectful of the rights of the offender in the abstract, in itself it is too 
indeterminate to limit the severity of punishment. The proportionality of 
punishment consists of two different aspects: ordinal proportionality and cardinal 
proportionality. Ordinal proportionality means that offences of similar seriousness 
receive punishments of similar severity and that the punishments increase in 
severity as offence seriousness increases. Cardinal proportionality concerns the 
severity of the entire scale of ordinally proportionate punishments. The problem 
for penal theorists is that while it is possible to devise ordinally proportionate 
sentencing regimes, there is no obvious answer to the question of how severe the 
punishments in that regime should be overall. The cardinal severity of the scale of 
ordinally proportionate punishment appears to be a contingent question. As John 
Braithwaite and Phillip Pettit put it: 
 
                                                     
9 See HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Clarendon Press, 1968).  
10 A von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (OUP, 1996). 
11 R Frase, Just Sentencing: Principles and Procedures for a Workable System (OUP, 2013). 
12 Although the idea of desert continues to be criticized by both consequentialist and non-
consequentialist theorists. See for example, N Lacey, State Punishment (OUP, 1988) and V Tadros, The 
Ends of Harm (OUP, 2011). 
13 There are retributivists who eschew any role for consequential justifications, see M Moore, Placing Blame 
(OUP, 1997) and RA Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (OUP, 2001). 
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 The eighteenth century judge who sentences the burglar to torture followed 
by death, the judge from Alabama who sentences him to ten years, and the 
judge from Amsterdam who sentences him to victim compensation all 
pronounce that they are giving the offender what he deserves. There is no 
retributivist answer as to which judge is right. On the retributivist’s view, so 
long as they are all handing down sentences for burglary that are 
proportionately more than those for less-serious crimes and proportionality 
less than those for more-serious crimes, they could all be right.14 
 
The indeterminacy of the idea of proportionality leaves the scale of proportional 
punishment open to the possibility of relatively severe sentencing scales where, for 
example, the death sentence or multiple life without parole sentences are possible 
for murder, permitting mandatory incarceration for minor crimes, all the while 
maintaining ordinal proportionality. The idea of proportionality in itself does not 
contain any inherent restraint on the cardinal scale of proportionate punishment,15 
which appears to be a contingent question of social convention.16 Should social 
convention, for whatever reason, come to regard the actions of offenders in 
general as constituting a more serious wrongdoing than was previously thought, 
then the retributive idea of proportionality seems to have in itself no capacity to 
resist that. Although liberals generally claim to prefer state coercion to be minimal, 
their penal theory lacks an inherent restraining mechanism on the severity of 
punishment. 
This problem is not necessarily fatal to liberal penal minimalism. Liberal 
theorists have responded to the problem of cardinal proportionality with various 
proposals as to how the overall scale of proportional punishments could be 
restrained.17 The point being made here is simply that the liberal idea of just 
punishment is not immune to tendencies towards penal severity. Moreover, as I 
shall argue below, the understanding of crime as a relation between an offender 
and a victim, an understanding that is dominant in both the moral philosophical 
theory of punishment and contemporary political discourse, will tend to construct 
any particular offence as a more serious wrongdoing than the political understanding 






                                                     
14 J Braithwaite and P Pettit, Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice  (OUP, 1990) 178. 
15 N Lacey and H Pickard, ‘The Chimera of Proportionality: Institutionalising Limits on Punishment in 
Contemporary Social and Political Systems’  (2015) 78(2) Modern Law Review 216. 
16 A Von Hirsch, ‘Proportionate Sentences: A Desert Perspective’ in A von Hirsch, A Ashworth and J 
Roberts (eds), Principled Sentencing (Hart, 2009) 120-21; RA Duff, Punishment, Communication, and 
Community, (OUP,  2001)  133–34. 
17 See for example A von Hirsch, n 10 above, Ch 5; R Lippke, ‘Anchoring the Sentencing Scale: A 
Modest Proposal’ (2012) 16(4) Theoretical Criminology 463-80. 
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2 IMPRISONMENT AND POLITICAL EQUALITY 
 
The democratic theory I will set out has much in common with the liberal 
retributive theory both in its sensitivity to individual rights and its commitment to 
the proportionality of punishment. I will argue, however, that democracy contains 
an inherent tendency to reduce the cardinal scale. The stronger a democracy is, the 
less imprisonment it will impose and vice versa. 
Unlike liberal penal theory, which has been predominantly understood as a 
question of moral philosophy, a democratic theory of punishment is necessarily a 
political theory of punishment. As Corey Brettschneider observes, the problem for 
democratic theory is not what the offender morally deserves, but what the state 
can legitimately do to its citizens.18 Numerous writers from various traditions have 
sought to address criminal law as a question of citizenship using both political and 
moral theory.19 Here I will develop a specifically democratic theory by 
reformulating Alan Brudner’s detailed elaboration of Georg Hegel’s penal theory.20 
I have argued elsewhere that, in its own avowedly liberal terms, Brudner’s account 
ultimately fails to explain or to resist the expansive penal regime that we have.21 
However, I think a more promising democratic theory can be developed by 
grounding the elements of Brudner’s Hegelian penal theory not, as he does, in the 
movement of reason through history, but from what is practically necessary for 
the achievement of political equality.  
Brudner sets out from the proposition that criminal law is coercion by a 
sovereign with a monopoly on legitimate coercion.22 He argues that coercion is 
only legitimately sovereign coercion if the state coerces in the public interest, which 
is to say in the pursuit of interests that are necessarily shared by all the law’s subjects. 
For Brudner, the public interest, or ‘public reason’, in a liberal state is individual 
freedom, since individual freedom is the interest that is necessarily shared by the 
citizens of a liberal state. The penal law of a liberal state and the limits on its use of 
coercion are therefore set by the public reason of individual freedom.23 
Following the same logic, a democratic criminal law is coercion by a 
democratic sovereign. The interest that is necessarily shared by all the subjects of a 
democratic sovereignty is political equality. The raison d’être of democracy is the 
                                                     
18 See Brettschneider, n 2 above 102. Compare M Dubber, ‘Criminal Police and Criminal Law in the 
Rechtsstaat’ in M Dubber and M Valverde (eds), Police and the Liberal State (Stanford UP, 2008) 95-6. 
19 In addition to Brettschneider and Dubber ibid, see, for example, N Lacey, State Punishment (Routledge, 
1988); Braithwaite and Pettit, n 14 above;  RA Duff, ‘A Criminal Law for Citizens’  (2010) 14 (3) 
Theoretical Criminology 293; RA Duff, ‘Responsibility, Citizenship and Criminal Law’ in RA Green and SP 
Green (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (OUP, 2011). For Rawlsian accounts see M 
Matravers, ‘Political Theory and the Criminal Law' in Duff and Green, ibid; E Melissaris ‘Toward a 
Political Theory of Criminal Law’ (2012) 15(1) New Criminal Law Review 122.  
20 A Brudner, Punishment and Freedom: A Liberal Theory of Penal Justice (OUP, 2009); GWF Hegel, Elements of 
the Philosophy of Right (CUP, 1991). 
21 P Ramsay, ‘The Dialogic Community at Dusk’ (2014) 1(2) Critical Analysis of Law 316.  
22 Brudner n 20 above, 21. 
23 Ibid, 22-23. 
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rule of the people and this entails the equal right of all citizens to participate in and 
to influence both the making of laws and the exercise of executive power. Political 
equality might, therefore, be called democracy’s public reason, since political 
equality is the interest necessarily shared by the citizens of a society that defines 
itself as democratic.  
Liberalism has good reasons to limit to the use of imprisonment because 
imprisonment entails a deprivation of individual liberty. However, the deprivation 
of liberty entailed by imprisonment also supplies democracy with good reason to 
limit its use. Every official deprivation of a citizen’s liberty represents a loss to a 
democracy since depriving a citizen of civil liberty is also a denial of political 
equality. To understand why this is so, it is necessary to spell out two particularly 
significant normative commitments entailed by political equality.  
The first implication of political equality is that to be committed to it requires 
making the assumption that ordinary citizens are normally competent to 
participate in the life of the state; that they are competent to rule themselves 
collectively.24 Political equality is a rational way to go about political decision-
making only if citizens are ordinarily competent to rule themselves collectively. 
What this means is that to be genuinely committed to political equality is to have 
no objection to collective self-government in so far as the citizenry has the will to 
govern itself. In a democracy, therefore, citizens have the formal status of rulers, 
and the law must address the citizens as the rulers that they are taken to be: the 
law must be consistent with its subjects also being its authors.25 And political 
equality implies more than just formal recognition of the citizen’s status as ruler. It 
is also a substantive condition in which upholding those formally equal rights to 
participate makes possible an actual equality of influence over law and policy.26  
Political equality does not guarantee collective self-government,27 but 
collective self-government is both the ultimate normative ground of formal 
political equality and its immanent potential. The rights that formally guarantee the 
political equality of citizens as rulers are the form taken by the political activity of 
collective self-rule. Political equality can, therefore, be more or less realized. The 
formal rights of political equality can be respected in practice to a greater or lesser 
degree by executive agents and other citizens. The citizenry that enjoys formal 
political equality can exert more or less influence over the making of law and the 
execution of policy. In any state of formal political equality, the degree to which 
                                                     
24 R Dahl, On Democracy (Yale UP, 1998) 74-76. Of course this assumption precisely assumes away the fact 
that individuals will in fact vary substantially in their competence in this respect. It is likely those who are 
particularly disadvantaged in this respect will make up a substantial proportion of the prison population. I 
return to this problem in Section 7 below. 
25 See Brettschneider, n 1 above, 33. 
26 Political equality is therefore a means to realizing Rousseau’s idea of freedom as obedience to laws one 
has given to oneself. See JJ Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book 1 Chapter 8 (Penguin, 1968) 65. 
27 To approach substantive political equality, actual collective self-government, citizens will need to 
exercise their political and civil rights and to develop sufficient knowledge of their circumstances to 
deliberate effectively – see discussion below and P Ramsay, ‘The Democratic Limits to Preventive 
Criminal Law’ in A Ashworth and L Zedner (eds), Prevention and the Limits of the Criminal Law (OUP, 2013) 
229-31. 
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substantive political equality is realized will therefore be subject to constant 
change.  
The second implication of political equality is that to have an equal influence 
over public policy and the making of the laws that we will obey, citizens need 
more than equal political rights. We must have not only an equal right to offer 
ourselves as political representatives, and an equal say in the choice of political 
representatives at elections.28 We also need very extensive freedom to discuss with 
prospective representatives what they should do; to express our opinions; to try to 
change the opinions of others and to have our opinions changed by the arguments 
of others; to associate with others for this purpose; and to assemble with others to 
debate and promote our political ideas. Without these civil liberties, actual 
legislative and policy proposals, and their promotion, will depend on more or less 
shadowy networks of citizens whose influence comes from private connections 
with existing legislators or the executive branch. Even if citizens outside those 
networks get to express a preference in a vote at the end of the process, much of 
the political deliberation will have taken place in the absence of most citizens who 
will be rendered dependent on the laws authored by others rather than the 
independent authors of the law. Such a regime could be more oligarchy than 
democracy precisely because it would frustrate political equality. True political 
equality therefore requires that the entire political process is open to all citizens on 
an equal basis and this entails civil liberties in addition to narrowly political 
rights.29 
Civil liberty is then an essential characteristic of political equality, and this 
explains why each and every act of imprisoning a citizen is a denial of political 
equality. It strips the citizen of the right to move, speak freely, assemble, associate 
and enjoy a private life. While imprisonment does not deprive a citizen of their 
nationality, or necessarily prevent them from exercising a right to vote or stand in 
elections, it does entail executive coercion that prevents a prisoner from 
participating in the political process on equal terms with other citizens. 
Imprisonment deprives a citizen of an essential aspect of democratic citizenship - 
formal political equality. The dependence on executive discretion that is entailed in 
imprisonment is simply inconsistent with participating in collective self-
government on an equal basis. Imprisonment is not inconsistent with participating 
in political life as such. Prisoners may be politically active and wield considerable 
political influence. But imprisonment is inconsistent with formal political equality. 
As a consequence, in a regime of political equality, prisoners have their political 
citizenship suspended for the duration of their imprisonment.30   
                                                     
28 On political representation as a means to collective self-government, rather than an obstacle, see D 
Plotke, ‘Representation is Democracy’ (1997) 4(1) Constellations 27; and N Urbinati, Representative Democracy: 
Principles and Genealogy (University of Chicago Press, 2006).  
29 R Dahl, On Political Equality (Yale UP, 2006) 12-18. 
30 Note that it is their political citizenship, not their nationality that is suspended on this account. 
Moreover political citizenship is suspended for the duration of imprisonment only. Political equality 
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This conclusion runs against the grain of an influential view among penal 
reformers that the rights of prisoners should be recognized because prisoners are 
citizens too.31 Whatever the motivation for this argument, its logic is subversive of 
democracy. Since prisoners lack civil liberties, to insist on their citizenship is to 
discount the civil liberties as an essential component of democratic citizenship.32 
From the point of view of penal reform, the argument that prisoners are citizens is 
perverse because it constructs imprisonment as consistent with a person’s 
continuing citizenship. It therefore implicitly normalizes imprisonment and 
undermines arguments against mass incarceration.33 From the democratic 
standpoint, by contrast, imprisonment can only be an exceptional condition 
precisely because imprisonment entails loss of political equality to a citizen, and so 
suspends their citizenship. It does not follow from this that prisoners have no 
rights in a democracy, only that their rights do not arise from their suspended 
political citizenship but from other duties owed to them by a democratic state.34 
However the fact that imprisonment suspends the political equality, and therefore 
the citizenship, of a ruler constitutes a problem for a democracy. Imprisonment 
represents such a fundamental infringement of the rights of democratic citizenship 




3 DEMOCRATIC RETRIBUTIVISM 
 
There are some limited circumstances in which upholding the norm of political 
equality allows for the possibility of denying political equality to particular citizens. 
As we have seen, political equality presupposes the equal right of all to influence 
the making of the laws, which is to say that in a democracy citizens enjoy the 
formal status of rulers. The ultimate political authority, therefore, lies with the 
citizens themselves. It follows that the only source of the political authority that 
would permit a citizen to be deprived of their share in ruling, and to have their 
citizenship suspended, is that citizen herself. Without the citizen’s permission, 
political equality would be violated. In what circumstances does a citizen provide 
the state with the authority to imprison her? 
                                                                                                                                       
provides no rationale for the practice of ‘felon disenfranchisement’ after release from prison, See P 
Ramsay, ‘Voters Should Not Be in Prison! The Rights of Prisoners in a Democracy'  (2013) 16(3) Critical 
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 421, 431. 
31 See, for example, C Behan, Citizen Convicts: Prisoners, politics and the vote  (Manchester UP, 2014); V Stern, 
‘Prisoners as Citizens: A Comparative View’ (2002) Probation Journal, 49; the contributions of Liberty, The 
Prison Reform Trust, the AIRE Centre and Caritas to the joint select committee on Draft Voting 
Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill, form (HL Paper 103, December 2013). 
32 P Ramsay, ‘Letting prisoners vote would undermine the idea that civil liberties are fundamental to 
democratic citizenship’ (2013) Democratic Audit UK (available at 
http://www.democraticaudit.com/?p=1765). 
33 Ibid. 
34 See Section 7 below and P Ramsay, ‘Voters Should not Be in Prison: The Rights of Prisoners in a 
Democracy’ (2013) 16(3) Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 421, 431-33. 
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We have seen that certain rights are essential to democratic self-government: 
the rights that we commonly refer to as civil liberties. However, these civil liberties 
are in turn dependent on the existence of certain rights of personhood, rights to 
control of one’s own body and personal property, without which the civil liberties 
would be nugatory. These rights of personhood are the rights that are upheld by 
the ordinary criminal law. They are not unique to democratic societies but they are 
nevertheless a necessary component of them. There would be no civil liberty to 
speak one’s mind and assemble with others in order to hear such speech if others 
could attack, kill or imprison the speaker or her audience with impunity. Speakers 
and audience would have to assert their rights to speak and assemble as natural 
rights in the Hobbesian sense or as revolutionary acts. They would have to enter 
the debate armed and ready for action. The underlying legal rights of personhood 
are, therefore, essential to the protection of political deliberation as a civil liberty. 
They are such a fundamental aspect of the existence of a state that we rarely think 
about them in the context of a democracy.35 It is here that democracy recognizes 
the insight of Hegelian political theory that a citizen may violate one of these 
rights in such a way as practically to deny the existence of such rights, and it is in 
such circumstances that a citizen can provide the authority for her own detention. 
When a person commits a criminal offence against the personhood of 
another, then, providing that conviction for the particular offence requires proof 
that its commission was deliberate, the citizen does something that constitutes a 
practical denial of the existence of the rights of personhood.36 Deliberate attacks 
on another’s person or deliberate interferences with another person’s property are 
the classic form taken by such rights denials. For example, if a person deliberately 
assaults another, she acts in a way that implicitly claims that her actions are not 
limited by the other’s rights.37 The attacker’s action in such a case is, therefore, not 
only a violation of the particular victim’s rights; it is also necessarily a denial of the 
existence of rights as such.38 This claim is not affected by the fact that much 
violent offending is a consequence of a failure to resist momentary impulses 
towards a particular other person. In so far as the act of violence is nevertheless 
conscious and deliberate, it constitutes a denial in practice of the existence of 
rights.39 It is important to keep in mind that this denial is not a matter of the 
particular citizen’s subjective opinions or motives in violating the rights of 
another; it is an assessment of the citizen’s action from the objective standpoint of 
                                                     
35 In a different register, see L Miller, ‘Power to the People: Violent Victimization, Inequality and 
Democratic Politics’ (2013) 17(3) Theoretical Criminology 283, 285. 
36 Here ‘deliberate’ implies intentionally or recklessly in the sense that the offender knew that there was a 
risk that they might violate rights (for a full account, see Brudner, n 20 above , Ch 2, esp 38-41. 
37 Unless of course they can claim that one of the general defences recognized by the criminal law applies 
to justify or exculpate their action. 
38 Brudner n 20 above, Ch2, esp 76-81. 
39 There is nevertheless the possibly intractable problem posed to ‘subjectivist’ legal doctrine by offenders 
who lose control of their emotions and act in blind rage. For a discussion, see A Norrie, Crime, Reason and 
History (CUP, 2014) 82-83. 
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her political equality with others. Since these rights are rights essential to the 
exercise of democratic citizenship, the attacker is denying the existence of rights 
essential to citizenship. When a citizen practically denies the existence of the rights 
of democratic citizenship in this way, she denies them to herself also, and 
effectively licenses the state to deny her rights and to infringe her political equality. 
If the state does imprison her, it will only be acting on the principle underlying her 
own actions: the principle that our actions are not limited by others’ rights.40 In 
other words, the state would be taking its authority to deny citizenship rights only 
from the citizen whose rights are to be denied.  
As I have argued elsewhere, this relationship between democratic rights and 
the need for proof of deliberation in criminal offences explains why the modern 
doctrines of mens rea, that require proof that a defendant intended or at least knew 
there was a risk that they would commit such an offence, came to prominence in 
criminal law doctrine as formal political equality advanced over the course of the 
19th and especially 20th centuries.41 Although these doctrines were promoted by 
law reformers who were inspired by utilitarian or broadly humanitarian aims, they 
gained traction with the criminal courts only as those whom the criminal courts 
condemned acquired the status of citizens, requiring the courts to show them the 
respect due to citizens at least in the law’s formal and recorded terms.42 Without 
proof of mens rea, there is no proof of deliberation, and therefore no proof that a 
citizen has by her actions denied the existence of rights and so given the state a 
license to imprison her and suspend her citizenship.  
This theory of punishment only justifies imprisonment for offences that 
involve proof of subjective mens rea. This would include all the so-called ‘true 
crimes’ (such as homicides, assaults, sexual assaults, thefts, robberies, criminal 
damage to property), but also public welfare offences, where these are committed 
intentionally or recklessly. The deliberate commission of public welfare offences 
also constitutes a denial of the authority of the democratic community to 
determine the scope of individual rights and duties, in this case with respect to 
upholding the social rights of citizenship rather than the civil rights.43 In so far as 
public welfare offences are legitimately used by a democracy to deter activity that 
creates an excessive risk of harm, negligence or strict liability may also be 
legitimately used as part that aim. However, the penalties that can be legitimately 
attached where these offences are committed negligently or without fault are 
limited to interferences with property rights – fines – because the merely negligent 
offender has given the state no permission to deny her political equality.44  
The licence to imprison, that the citizen grants when she commits a deliberate 
rights denial, is generally implicit. Many offenders would not recognize that they 
                                                     
40 Democratizing Brudner, n 20 above, 41. 
41 See P Ramsay, ‘The Responsible Subject as Citizen: Criminal Law, Democracy and the Welfare State’ 
(2006) 69(1) Modern Law Review 29. 
42 Ibid, 41-45. 
43 For the basic connection between democracy and public welfare offences see ibid, 48-52. 
44 See Brudner, n 20 above, 177-78. It is not the case that existing formal democracies abide by this 
limitation. 
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had granted it (an issue I will return to in Section 7 below). The license is 
nevertheless real, in the sense that it is an objective implication of the offender’s 
own action, assuming that the offender is a political equal with all other citizens. 
The granting of this licence by the offender is a necessary condition of 
imprisonment in a society where all citizens are equal in their formal status as 
rulers.45  
Like any retributive justification of punishment, democratic retributivism is 
limited to punishments that are proportional to the rights violation committed by 
the offender. Any particular offender’s criminal denial of rights is specific; it only 
goes so far. A particular offence will involve a different degree of denial according 
to whether the offender intended or merely risked the particular rights violation. 
Moreover, the extent of any particular rights violation also varies according to the 
amount of harm done to the victim. The reason for the importance of harm is that 
the personhood of persons exists in embodied creatures that have needs and 
desires. Participation in self-government depends upon various agency goods 
(such as life and limb, health, personal property and so on) that are necessary to 
the satisfaction of these needs and desires. Coercion of others’ personhood can 
and often does involve harm to these essential agency goods and the extent of this 
harm affects the extent to which the offender acted without regard to the rights of 
others.46 In other words, a murder is a more serious and determined denial of 
rights than non-intentional homicide; homicide is more serious than causing minor 
bodily harms; and they are in turn more serious than thefts and so on. Since the 
offender’s specific practical denial of rights only goes so far, it only permits a 
proportional response. A disproportionate deprivation would be in excess of the 
authority granted to the state by the citizen-ruler and, therefore, a violation of 
political equality.   
Although this argument explains why a democracy can punish and imprison 
some of its citizens, it leaves this democratic account with the same problem faced 
by liberal justifications of punishment: the contingency of the cardinal scale of 
proportional punishment.47 What is to stop democratic punishments being harsh 






                                                     
45 See also Brettschneider, n 1 above ,104. 
46 Brudner, n 20 above, 138-39. 
47 It also endures the difficulties associated with establishing an acceptable ordinal scale of 
proportionality. But unlike some moral desert theories, this difficulty is ameliorated by legal 
retributivism’s commitment only to not imposing disproportionate punishment, to a ‘limiting 
retributivism’ (see Brudner n 20 above, 55; and also Frase, n 11 above). 
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4 DEMOCRATIC DECREMENTALISM  
 
The first part of the democrats’ answer is that, so far, we have only established 
that in certain circumstances a citizen-offender gives implicit permission to the 
democratic state to impose a proportional deprivation of her rights. This identifies 
the source of the democratic state’s authority to punish, but it does not tell us what 
reason a democratic state would have to act on that authority or how severe any 
punishment should be, other than it must be ordinally proportionate. Even where 
imprisonment has been permitted by a citizen, the citizen’s equal status will be 
suspended by imprisonment and she will be excluded from equal participation in 
the process of collective self-government. A state that is committed to political 
equality will therefore need good reason to maintain a cardinal scale of 
punishment that includes deprivations of liberty as a penal response to criminal 
rights-denials, reasons going beyond the mere fact that the citizen-offender has 
licensed such a response. 
The one compelling reason for a democratic state to act on the citizen-
offender’s authorization to interfere with her rights is that such a punishment 
would serve to uphold political equality in general, even as it interferes with it in 
the particular case.  Imprisonment and other forms of penal hard treatment can do 
this in so far as they are necessary in order to realize the rights of citizenship. Here 
too we can democratize Brudner’s theory. The offender has denied the existence 
of rights not by merely expressing an opinion that people have no rights 
(permissible from the point of view of political equality), but in practice, by acting 
on the principle that she is not limited by others’ rights. Punishment, by turning 
the offender’s own principle back upon herself, ‘acts out’ the self-contradictory 
character of this ‘criminal principle’ and, in so doing, it restores the rule of law.48 
In this way, state punishment realizes (gives reality to) the authority of democratic 
rights. When a democratic state removes the offender’s rights, it demonstrates in 
practice that the offender’s denial of democratic rights was a nullity. Or, to put the 
point the other way around, punishment (and imprisonment as a punishment) will 
be necessary in a democracy only in so far as the failure by the state to punish a 
criminal rights-denials would, by leaving the offender’s rights denials unchallenged 
in practice, tend to undermine the reality of citizens’ rights.  
This political theory of punishment does not deny (the familiar idea) that 
crimes are often also moral wrongs perpetrated by the offender against a victim. It 
does deny that the moral aspect of a crime is the business of the state. Rather a 
moral wrong only becomes a truly criminal wrong when it amounts to a denial of 
the existence of rights, because the business of the state in wrongdoing is the 
realization of rights.49  
                                                     
48 See Brudner, n 20 above, 45-48.  
49 Although in its regulatory function the state also has a role in deterring excessive risk creation. But as 
we noted above, where causing or increasing the risk of harm involves no denial of rights, imprisonment 
is ruled out as a penal response to violations of the law. 
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In a democratic regime, the cardinal scale of punishment is, therefore, set by 
whatever is necessary to realize those rights that protect citizens’ political equality, 
which is to say their equal status as rulers. How much punishment will that be? 
The answer to that question will depend on how potent the challenge of any 
criminal act is to the reality of democratic rights. The critical point here is that 
citizens’ rights, and citizens’ status as rulers, are not realized only, or even 
primarily, by negating criminal challenges to them by means of state punishment. 
In a democracy, citizens’ status as rulers will be realized to the extent that practical 
respect for their rights is at the core of the everyday practice of both state agents 
and citizens. The more that state officials and other citizens are respectful of each 
others’ status as co-rulers, and the more that state officials are practically 
dependent on the citizenry for their day-to-day power and authority, the more 
fully realized will be the rights of democratic citizenship and the stronger the 
authority of the democratic legal regime. And the stronger is the authority of these 
rights of democratic citizenship, the less significant any particular criminal denial 
of their authority will be. The less potent the offender’s rights denial, the less 
necessity for the state to negate it in the form of punishment. In other words, the 
more that the state is characterized by the political equality of its citizens, which is 
to say, the more democratic is the state, the less the challenge that any particular 
offence will represent to the rights of citizenship. As a consequence, the better 
realized are democratic rights and the stronger the democracy, the lower will be 
the cardinal scale of penal proportionality, and the more room there will be for 
leniency, since not every criminal rights denial will require a penal response for the 
regime of democratic rights to enjoy effectively unchallenged supremacy.50 
This is a radically decrementalist theory of the cardinal scale of proportional 
punishments. To understand the decrementalism of this penal rationale, it is 
necessary fully to grasp the potential that dwells within the concept of political 
equality. The democratic rationale for political equality is the shared capacity for 
self-government. Realising that potential so that citizens actually become self-
governing by rendering the state dependent on those citizens’ vigilant exercise of 
their rights, which is to say democratizing the state, tends to diminish the potency 
of the specifically criminal aspect of criminal acts – their denial of the rights of 
persons. As rights are strengthened in every other aspect of the relation of state 
and citizens, the specifically criminal aspect of criminal acts diminishes in relative 
significance, and so too does the need for severe punishments such as 
imprisonment. Should criminal denials of rights persist in a democratic regime that 
had become so strong that those offences no longer present a significant challenge 
to the reality of democratic rights, then restorative methods involving interested 
                                                     
50 Again democratizing Brudner and Hegel, see A Brudner, ‘The Contraction of Crime in Hegel’s 
Rechtsphilosophie’, in Markus D. Dubber (ed), Foundational Texts in Modern Criminal Law (OUP, 2014) 160-
61. 
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parties can be substituted for incarceration.51 Such a wholesale substitution of 
restorative methods for state punishment would be mediated by something like 
what Albert Dzur calls ‘thick populism’: the development of a political way of life 
in which the citizenry organizes itself, through the exercise of its political rights, to 
carry out the process of government in collaboration with experts.52 
There are numerous potential objections to this democratic theory. The first 
and most important is that the argument made so far is obviously very abstract, 
and deliberately so. It is trying to establish some logical relations between the 
normative ground of political equality, the criminal laws of political equality and 
the practice of imprisonment by the state. As a logical argument, it might appear 
to be unrealistic. In the process of elaborating it, I have imagined a society in 
which serious crimes might acquire a significance that is so limited as to no longer 
make imprisonment a necessary response to them. This is, of course, the opposite 
of our recent experience, in which the state’s penal responses have become more 
severe. However, it is precisely this contemporary reality that indicates that the 
democratic theory is a realistic theory. The recent expansion of incarceration has 
occurred over the same period in which Western societies have retreated away 
from the conditions of political equality towards a condition increasingly referred 
to as ‘post-democracy’.53 There is reason to believe that the relationship between 




5 ‘POST-DEMOCRATIC’ PUNISHMENT 
 
The period since the 1970s, the period in which incarceration rates have risen, has 
also been a period in which the ideas of popular sovereignty and collective self-
government have been eliminated from the content of electoral politics. The 
decisive shift occurred when left-of-centre political parties retreated from 
longstanding commitments to intervene in the market economy to guarantee full 
employment and to negotiate deals between employers and trades unions. The 
acceptance that ‘there is no alternative’ to the market removed basic economic and 
social questions, questions about the organization of the production and 
distribution of goods and services, from political contestation. In so doing, the 
underlying normative proposition of political equality, that is, the idea that the 
political sphere was one through which the citizenry as a whole could gain 
collective control of their circumstances and approach collective self-government, 
                                                     
51 See Brudner, ibid, 161. However, note that restorative justice methods may gain traction wherever the 
state tends to lose its ideological significance as a protagonist in the wrongs that concern criminal justice. 
This can occur not only from the realization of rights but also from the redefinition of crime as a relation 
of perpetrator and victim, as in the present. See also text and note at n 63 below. 
52 See Dzur, n 4 above, 36. 
53 J Ranciere, Disagreement (University of Minnesota Press, 1995); C Crouch, Post-Democracy (Polity 2004); J 
Habermas, Guardian 10 November 2011. 
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was marginalized.54 Electoral politics was eviscerated. The parties of the left 
abandoned their traditional constituencies, and, without the threat of socialism and 
social democracy, the political mobilization of traditional conservatives also lost its 
rationale. Participation in electoral and representative politics has since suffered 
very significant decline, with electoral turnouts falling and party membership 
falling further. Politics has become a spectator sport: ‘a tightly controlled spectacle 
managed by rival teams of professionals expert in the techniques of persuasion, 
and considering a small range of issues selected by those teams’ in which ‘the mass 
of citizens plays a passive, quiescent, even apathetic part’.55  
In other words, the emergence of populist penal policy at the same time only 
tells us that the popularity of punishment is more or less proportional to the 
unpopularity of politics. As Ian Loader puts it, crime is  ‘the preoccupation of a 
world no longer enchanted and animated by political vision(s)’.56 The dismal 
contemporary politics of crime and punishment have emerged as democracy has 
declined. Moreover, the rising severity of punishment, and of prisoner numbers, is 
a function of the qualitative decline in political equality. These two processes, 
declining political participation and rising imprisonment, are mediated by a 
transformation in the meaning of citizenship over the same period. Citizens of 
contemporary Western democracies are no longer integrated into the political 
community by virtue of their political role as co-rulers, even in theory. Citizens 
have been redefined as consumers: consumers in highly regulated markets for 
privately provided goods and services, consumers of public services, and indeed 
consumers of politics.57  
Crucially, for our purposes, this transformation of the meaning of citizenship 
has transformed the relation of citizens to the particular ‘public service’ that is the 
criminal justice system. For the consumer-citizen, autonomy lies in being able to 
realize her identity from the plurality of available lifestyles in the consumer 
society.58 The consumer process of personal differentiation is quite different from, 
and in some respects opposed to, the process of ideological contestation that 
characterizes political citizenship, the political process through which shared and 
conflicting interests are identified and disputed or reconciled.59 Where political 
citizenship aspires to self-rule, the individual consumer-citizen’s autonomy appears 
to be intrinsically vulnerable to forces beyond her control, as I have argued 
                                                     
54 ‘Government by the people for the people becomes meaningless unless it includes major economic 
decision-making by the people for the people.’ J Reid, Rector’s Inaugural Address Glasgow University 
1972, reprinted in The Independent, 13 August 2010. 
55 Crouch, n 53 above, 4. 
56 Loader, n 3 above, 405. 
57 C Crouch, n 53 above, Ch5; W Streeck, ‘Citizens as Customers: Considerations on the New Politics of 
Consumption’ (2012)76 New Left Review 27; K Faulks, Citizenship in Modern Britain 134 (1998); P Ramsay, 
The Insecurity State (OUP, 2012), 102-05.  
58 A Giddens, The Third Way (Polity, 1998) 37; A Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the 
Late Modern Age (1991).  
59 Streeck, n 57 above. 
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elsewhere in detail.60 This intrinsic vulnerability of the consumer-citizen to harm is 
particularly sharply focused in criminal justice. As consumers of criminal justice 
services, citizens have been redefined as potential victims of crime.61 Jonathan 
Simon points out that because the representative subject of law is conceived as a 
victim in this way, the vulnerability of the victim to criminal harm comes to ‘define 
the appropriate conditions for government intervention’.62  
Reimagining criminal justice as a question of a service to the vulnerable 
potential victims of crime reconceives crime itself as a moral relation between 
victim and offender rather than a political-constitutional relation of sovereign and 
subject. This tendency of the official mind to construct crime as a moral relation 
between victim and offender is, as we have seen above, the opposite of the 
democratic conception of crime as the denial of the existence of rights. It has an 
inflationary tendency on penal severity for at least three reasons.63 
In general terms, any particular offence, when it is viewed in the abstract from 
the standpoint of a victim, as a moral wrong that has been done to that victim, 
necessarily appears to be more potent than it appears from the standpoint of the 
state, as a practical denial of the existence of rights.64 The more that criminal 
offences are understood and constructed as wrongs to victims, as opposed to 
denials of rights in general, the more that the cardinal scale will tend to rise. It is 
striking that the major cause of the rising prison population in England, at a time 
when crime rates have been declining, is increasing sentence severity with a higher 
proportion of convicted offenders receiving custodial sentences and the average 
length of those sentences increasing.65  
A further tendency to penal escalation arises from the way that reconstructing 
the justification of punishment as a service to potential victims tends to reorder 
the relationship of retribution and incapacitation. When citizens are defined by 
their vulnerability to crime, their perception of their security becomes a vital 
interest because their freedom will be limited in so far as they are not secure from 
potential victimisation. As a result of this, the criminal law of consumer-
citizenship increasingly protects a right to security by constructing dangerousness as a 
moral and penal wrong.66 Simply being dangerous is a violation of the right to 
                                                     
60 Ramsay, n 57 above, Ch 5. See also J Simon, Governing Through Crime: (2007) 86-89, although Jonathan 
Simon having identified the vulnerability of the consumer-citizen also suggests that the citizen-as-victim 
is a substitute for the citizen-as-consumer (ibid, 89), rather than a particular expression of the citizen-as-
consumer, as I argue. 
61 Ramsay, n 57 above, 103-04. 
62 Simon, n 60 above, 76. 
63 This is only one tendency in the current order. The official reconceiving of crime as a relation of 
perpetrator and victim independent of the state creates other tendencies such as the attempts to 
institutionalize restorative justice.  
64 Bear in mind that we are speaking here of an official construction of the citizen as victim, just as 
democratic political communities construct citizens as persons. Actual victims may be very robust in their 
response to an offence and/or very forgiving towards the offender. However, even from the standpoint 
of such concrete victims, an offender’s wrongdoing is going to be more potent as a moral wrongdoing 
against them than it will be to the state as a denial of rights as such. 
65 See Ministry of Justice, n 2 above. 
66 For a detailed discussion, see Ramsay, n 57 above. 
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security, and once dangerousness itself is considered a wrong deserving of 
punishment, then incapacitation becomes a proportionate response to the wrong 
of dangerousness.67 In this precautionary understanding of criminal justice not 
only does preventive incarceration acquire a new retributive rationale, but the 
scope of the criminal law will also tend to expand to cover ‘pre-inchoate’ conduct 
that involves no practical denial of rights but rather attracts liability to 
imprisonment because it provides evidence of criminal intentions or at least of a 
willingness to increase the risk of future criminal wrongdoings.68 More prisoners 
and longer sentences are the result. 
Thirdly, as a precautionary construction of criminal justice has established 
itself, the regulatory public welfare offences acquire a new significance.  Although 
they involve no violation of a particular victim’s rights, and no immediate harm 
caused, commission of these offences will typically increase downstream risks of 
harm (the supply of drugs or possession offences, for example). From the 
precautionary standpoint, failing to cooperate with harm prevention policy in the 
form of committing these offences is a more serious wrong than it is in from the 
democratic standpoint.  
In other words, the populist tough-on-crime policies and the penal severity of 
the period in which prison populations have risen, have proved electorally 
necessary in societies in which citizens have come to vote as individuated and 
vulnerable political consumers rather than as politically organized aspirant co-
rulers. Instead of being addressed by the penal law as rational persons capable of 
self-rule, they are addressed as victims and dangerous offenders instead.69 Markus 
Dubber points out that as a way of defining the law’s subjects, the ‘victim’ and the 
‘offender’ have something in common. Both are formally stripped of their 
personhood. This transformation of the meaning of citizenship subverts the legal 
recognition of personhood that democracy presupposes. In the same moment, it 
occludes the normative basis of political equality in the potential for collective self-
government and creates a powerful tendency to penal severity.  
Political equality has been denuded of its ideological content and lost the 
force that animated it – the popular engagement of a wide spectrum of citizens in 
the task of collective self-government though mass political parties. As the form of 
political equality has been emptied of life, so the form itself is proving vulnerable 
to decay. In recent years, the protection of civil liberty that we saw was essential to 
                                                     
67 That incapacitation could be a proportionate retributive response to the wrong of dangerousness 
should not surprise us since proportionality as such ‘is virtually indeterminate in its substantive 
implications’, see Lacey and Pickard, n 15 above. On incapacitation as a retributive response, see J Floud 
and W Young, Dangerousness and Criminal Justice (Heinemann, 1981) 46; D Husak, ‘Lifting the Cloak: 
Preventive Detention as Punishment’ (2011) 48 San Diego Law Review 1173; P Ramsay, ‘Imprisonment 
Under the Precautionary Principle’ in GR Sullivan and I Dennis (eds), Seeking Security: Pre-empting the 
Commission of Criminal Harms (Hart, 2012).  
68 See P Ramsay, Pashukanis and Public Protection in M Dubber (ed), Foundational Texts in Criminal Law 
(OUP, 2014) 201-04; or Ramsay, Insecurity State, n 57 above, esp Ch 7.  
69 See MD Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime (NYU Press, 2002) 154-55. 
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political equality has slowly given way to ever-wider restrictions on freedoms of 
expression, association and assembly and very extensive state surveillance of 
private communications.70  
The tendency towards penal severity and mass incarceration is the inverse of 
the tendency towards political equality. Logically, mass incarceration is a sign that 
political equality is poorly realized; practically, the rise in imprisonment in recent 
years is a symptom of the retreat of political equality in our public life. The only 
sense in which mass incarceration in the present could be laid at the door of 
democracy is the sense in which it arises from the failure of the citizenry to 
achieve democracy’s end, to realize political equality in full. Though my emphasis 
here is more on ideological change and the historical decline of the old 
representative politics, the conclusions of this argument closely parallel the 
observations of Vanessa Barker’s detailed comparative political sociology of 
American jurisdictions. As she puts it: ‘at the aggregate level, depressed civic 
engagement, withdrawal from public life, and lack of public participation in the 
political process may underpin mass incarceration in the United States’.71 They 
also support Barker’s ‘counterintuitive claim’ that ‘increased democratization can 
support and sustain less coercive penal regimes’.72 
Even if this democratic theory offers a realistic account of the present 
experience, there are other potential objections to it. Here I will briefly consider 
the implications of this account for the punishment of non-citizens and then 
outline a response to what I take to be an important normative doubt about 




6 THE IMPRISONMENT OF NON-CITIZENS 
 
The theory of democratic retributivism that I have outlined here seeks to limit 
penal coercion to that which is consistent with the political equality of citizens. Its 
normative assumption is that human individuals are together capable of achieving 
collective self-government. The democratic theory is not based on any 
particularistic notion of the moral unity of a particular ethnic group or nationality. 
Once personhood is recognized as the basis of democratic citizenship, then all 
persons become potential citizens. A democracy that takes its virtues of political 
freedom and collective self-determination seriously will therefore protect and 





                                                     
70 For a summary, see KD Ewing, Bonfire of the Liberties (OUP, 2010) Chs 2-7.  
71 Barker, n 6 above, 12. 
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7 DEMOCRATIC RETRIBUTIVISM AND SOCIAL INJUSTICE 
 
The democratic theory of punishment presented here is a retributive theory. It is 
not a theory of moral retributivism, but of what Brudner calls legal retributivism. 
The legal structure of criminal offences, with clearly specified conduct elements 
and proof of mens rea, is intended to ensure not that punishment by the state is 
morally deserved, but that it has the offender’s authority behind it so as to be 
consistent with political equality. However, it is true that this authorization is in a 
large majority of cases implicit. If asked about this, a particular offender who is 
convicted and punished is unlikely to agree that she has given permission for her 
own punishment. These legal forms of punishment treat concrete particular 
individuals as if they had the abstract and universal characteristics of democratic 
citizens; in other words, they hold offenders to a standard of conduct that takes 
little or no account of their concrete personalities or the broader social 
circumstances in which their choices to violate others’ rights are made.73 The very 
idea of personhood, of individuals as rational agents, on which the democratic 
theory relies, is an abstraction. Rational agency is an emergent property of 
embodied creatures with needs as well as the capacity to reason.74 There are many 
ways in which a human’s needs may not be met, and this failure can inhibit the 
development of the self-control that characterizes the abstract rational person. 
Rational agency is, therefore, a property that is more or less fully realized in 
concrete human individuals.  
The consequence of this abstraction lying at the heart of criminal justice is 
that the burden of the enforcement of formal equal rights by legal retributivism 
will fall most heavily on the most disadvantaged, those who for one reason or 
another are least able to conform their behaviour to the requirements of equal 
rights. This means that doing criminal justice may continue to be an aspect of a 
broader injustice.75 It will be those who most lack the economic, social and 
psychological resources conducive to participation in self-government who will in 
practice be more likely to go to prison, and democratic punishment will be one 
more mechanism for the political and social exclusion of those who have the least 
control as individuals over their lives. To put it mildly, that seems to be in tension 
with democratic aspirations. Democratic legal retributivism is in principle open to 
this criticism just as is the retributive theory that it democratizes.  
Democratic legal retributivism does not achieve social justice. It does not 
achieve it because ultimately justice is not its purpose or rationale. The rationale of 
democratic legal retributivism is to realize more basic conditions of political 
                                                     
73 See Alan Norrie’s critique of Hegel on this point in Law, Ideology and Punishment, (Kluwer, 1991) 83-85. 
74 C Reeves, ‘Retribution and the Metaphysics of Agency’, Unpublished paper. It is not necessary to 
adopt all the detail of any particular psychoanalytic theory to agree that individual rational agency is not 
something that we are born with. 
75 See A Norrie, Punishment Responsibility and Justice (OUP, 2000) Ch 9; B Hudson, ‘Beyond Proportionate 
Punishment’ (1995) 22 Crime, Law and Social Change 59.  
  
Peter Ramsay                                                                      Imprisonment and Political Equality 
 
 21 
equality – the formal rights essential to political equality. However, as we have 
already seen, political equality is, like individual agency, an emergent property. The 
emergence of a real substantive equality of influence over the state and society is 
the normative ground and immanent potential of equal political rights and civil 
liberties. Democracy upholds the formal rights of political equality in advance of 
the achievement of the collective self-government that is its rationale and its 
potential, and it does so in order to achieve that potential. By the same token, 
democracy upholds the rights of persons in advance of the full achievement of the 
rational agency among concrete agents that these rights formally declare, and it 
does so in order to foster that agency. As a consequence, democratic legal 
retributivism radically mitigates the force of the social justice criticism of 
retributivism in three ways. 
Realising political equality is among other things a mechanism for eliminating 
criminogenic social and economic conditions. In realizing political equality, the 
majority of citizens gain access to the state’s wider powers to reorganize, regulate 
and coerce, allowing them to democratize society’s system for meeting human 
needs. It is well known that the burden of crime and punishment falls 
overwhelmingly on the most economically disadvantaged sections of the 
population, the sections of society least likely to be engaged in the political life of 
the state. However, the more that a society seeks to realize political equality’s 
normative content, the more it will seek to universalize the exercise of democratic 
rights. Citizens who respect themselves and each other on the grounds of their 
political equality, who respect each other’s status as co-rulers, will seek to use their 
political influence over the state to eliminate the relatively poor social conditions 
that both contribute to criminal wrongdoing and make it less likely that individuals 
will contribute to collective self-government. The more that citizens are moved by 
their formal rights to achieve the content of political equality, to make themselves, 
and all of themselves, the source of the state’s authority, the less interest they will 
have in denying the conditions of their collective self-government, either by 
engaging in crime or by tolerating the persistence of the relative deprivation and 
inequality in which ordinary crime flourishes. 
This argument too will appear idealistic but only for as long as we take our 
present circumstance of de-democratization for granted. At the sharp end of the 
process of democratization being described here is the political equality of the 
relatively disadvantaged sections of society, those that have a much greater interest 
in preventing crime by improving their economic lot than they do in punishing the 
offenders among them. As Lisa Miller puts it: ‘When lawmakers are made to 
answer to people who are likely to experience violence and the collateral 
consequences of a wide range of social and economic insecurities, there are fewer 
political incentives to rely on imprisonment as the sole or primary policy 
response.’76 Moreover, this tendency of political equality to eliminate criminogenic 
conditions will also tend to reduce the incidence of criminal rights denials, and in 
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this way reduce the challenge to the authority of rights that crime represents, and 
so decrease the scale and extent of imprisonment. 
Secondly, since democratic legal retributivism in theory eliminates moral 
blame from criminal justice, it is open to a much more constructive penal regime 
than that maintained in most Western prison systems. To a democracy, criminal 
punishment consists in a loss of civil liberties because it is an official response that 
denies the criminal denial of rights. It requires no hard treatment in any other way. 
Moreover, in so far as society considers the question of moral blame for criminal 
offending, and to whom blame should be attributed, a democracy cannot pretend 
that the conditions in which citizens are socialized do not contribute to crime, or 
that all the responsibility can be laid at the offender’s door. As a regime that lays 
claim to the tasks of collective self-government, a democratic sovereignty cannot 
deny responsibility for the social condition of the population.77 In general, the 
moral blame for offending must be shared between offenders and society as a 
whole.78 As a consequence, society as a whole acquires responsibilities to the 
offender. Within the constraints of proportionality and respect for the personhood 
of the offender, it is open to a vigorous rehabilitative approach, one that implies 
that prison conditions should be better than merely decent, and much better than 
they are now.79  
Finally, the radical decrementalism of a penal system grounded in political 
equality opens a road towards the abolition of imprisonment as a response to the 




8 DEMOCRATIC RETRIBUTIVE ABOLITIONISM 
 
A democratic state may continue to require imprisonment, but only for so long as 
it is weak because actual involvement of citizens in their own self-government 
remains limited, and their political equality little more than a formality. As we saw 
above, the more that the relation of state and citizens is one practically governed 
and organized by citizens’ extensive democratic rights, the less imprisonment will 
be needed, and vice versa. Democracy contains an inherent tendency to the 
abolition of state punishment. The realization of political equality is a process that 
engages people in their own collective life in a way that reduces the necessity for 
imprisonment. Individual rights in a state that was in reality nothing other than the 
                                                     
77 ‘We who believe in democratic goals are obliged to search for ways by which citizens can acquire the 
competence they need.’ Dahl, n 24 above, 80. 
78 Compare Norrie, n 75 above, 220-21. 
79 On the relation of rehabilitation and responsibility without ‘affective blame’, see also N Lacey and H 
Pickard, ‘From the Consulting Room to the Court Room? Taking the Clinical Model of Responsibility 
Without Blame into the Legal Realm’ (2012) 33 (1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1. 
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collective political action of its citizens would need no imprisonment to realize 
them.80  
The virtue of democratic retributivism is that although it tends towards 
abolition, it does not pretend that imprisonment can simply be abolished. Nor is it 
content with a simple antithesis between retributive criminal justice and restorative 
justice. Rather it identifies the specific weakness of a democratic society that 
necessitates the persistence of criminal justice and state punishment. That 
weakness is our failure fully to recognize ourselves, and each other, as the rulers of 
our collective life, and the related inability to know how to act like rulers. This 
failure deprives democratic societies of their essential moral force: us.81 In the 
same moment, it identifies political equality as a basis on which restorative and 
rehabilitative methods can be progressively substituted for state punishment, and 
especially for imprisonment.  
Democrats have no reason, therefore, to be defensive about the relation of 
democratic politics and state punishment. Democracy and imprisonment are 
antithetical. The increasing imprisonment of recent decades is a result of 
democracy’s retreat over the same period. The democratic penal theory seems 
unrealistic because democracy has been in retreat for decades, and the politics of 
popular sovereignty have been marginalized. Nonetheless, underlying this very 
appearance is the proof of the democratic theory: the increase in imprisonment 
has arisen from democracy’s retreat. What this negative proof means, however, is 
that even though democrats have no cause to be defensive about imprisonment, 
we nevertheless confront an enormous intellectual and political challenge.  
We have become accustomed to very low horizons with respect to the 
possibility of true democratic self-government. Even the language used to describe 
the contemporary process of de-democratization constructs democracy as a thing 
of the past. Although the Western democracies that developed in the twentieth 
century never fully achieved even formal political equality, the subsequent retreat 
from the limited degree of political participation achieved then has come to be 
described as ‘post-democracy’. The citizenry of these countries is marked by 
depoliticization and its accompanying outlook of generalised distrust, anxiety and 
vulnerability. Reversing the depoliticizing trends of recent decades by inspiring 
citizens to take responsibility for our collective social life and to realize political 
equality is not going to be easy. Nevertheless, one among many reasons to try is 
that democracy provides a way out of the carceral state.  
 
                                                     
80 In other words, the radical democratization of the penal state entails its withering away, see B Fine, 
Democracy and the Rule of Law (The Blackburn Press, 2002) 169.  
81 See A Dzur, ‘Repellent Institutions and the Absentee Public: Grounding Opinion in Responsibility for 
Punishment’,in J Ryberg and JV Roberts (eds), Popular Punishment: On the Normative Significance of Public 
Opinion (OUP, 2014) 207-08. 
 
